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Abstract 
Increasingly minority youth, especially from Muslim backgrounds, have been seen in Australian public policy and the 
media as potentially disruptive and transgressive. In some European societies similar young people have been por-
trayed as living in parallel and disconnected social spaces, self-segregated from interaction with the wider community. 
Yet Australian ethnic minority youth do not fulfil either of these stereotypes. Rather, despite their often regular experi-
ences of racism or discrimination, they continue to assert a strong identification with and belonging to Australian socie-
ty, albeit the society that marginalizes and denigrates their cultural capital. In particular it is the neighbourhood and the 
locality that provides the bridge between their home cultures and the broader world, contributing to a range of positive 
aspirations and fluid identities. 
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1. Immigration and Social Transformation:  
An Introduction 
Since the beginning of this century immigration to Aus-
tralia has accelerated, accompanied by a major rise in 
shorter-stay residents such as contract workers and in-
ternational students. As immigration has once more 
burgeoned, so the youth component of the immigrant 
population (born overseas and born locally of overseas 
born parents) has also expanded (Collins, 2013). This 
paper asks: what does the expanding presence of mi-
nority youth mean for the social transformation of Aus-
tralian society? As analysts such as Anita Harris (2010) 
have argued, public policy is increasingly perturbed by 
the apparent growing marginalisation of minority 
youth from mainstream culture, yet the public conver-
sation about these concerns fails to recognise either 
the super-globalisation that has transformed national 
boundaries, or the densification of diasporic communi-
ties that globalisation has thus enabled. Our research 
on minority youth reported and discussed in this paper, 
explores to what extent minority youth are indeed 
“marginalised”, and what the implications may be of 
their relationship to questions of identity and belong-
ing. We ask whether the social transformations that 
are discernable are producing marginalisation, and if 
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they are, are these tensions productive of positive so-
cial transformations leading to new forms of inclusion 
and belonging, even if they are no longer codified in 
some archaic, unitary and undifferentiated idea of the 
nation? 
We begin by setting the context, then we explore 
what we mean by social transformation, and then we 
proceed to identify and investigate the place of minority 
youth in the processes we examine. Finally we assess the 
implications for public policy of the situations we report.  
Australia has been a society formed by immigration 
since its first invasion and settlement by Europeans in 
the late eighteenth century, so that much of its history 
has been concerned with government control over the 
makeup of its population. Australia had a culturally di-
verse population in the nineteenth century; the original 
Indigenous population encompassed many hundreds of 
nations, while the gold rushes in particular drew tens 
of thousands of fortune-seekers including significant 
numbers of Chinese and other Asians. Much of this 
non-European immigrant diversity was stalled by the 
White Australia immigration restriction policies intro-
duced after Federation in 1901, while Indigenous popu-
lations also fell under the impact of introduced diseas-
es, frontier violence and the loss of land. For three 
generations after the foundation of the Common-
wealth, national policy focussed on building a popula-
tion by excluding “non-White” immigration and expel-
ling non-White settlers, while assimilating the surviving 
Indigenous peoples. After World War II, national policy 
expanded its search for immigrants to non-British parts 
of Europe, while retaining barriers to non-White entry. 
In a short period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s 
however, governments of both conservative and Labor 
orientation opened up immigration to new populations 
from across the world (Jakubowicz, 2009).  
From about 1970 onwards migration included new 
intakes of Muslims in what had been in the past an 
overwhelming European Christian immigration intake; 
it also began to include significant numbers of both 
Christians and non-Christians from Indo-China and Chi-
na, and from the Middle East. Later it would also draw 
in people from many African countries, both Christian 
and Muslim, so that by Census Day 2011 Australia was 
no longer recognisable in its ethno-cultural diversity as 
the country it had been two generations before (DIAC 
2013; Ho & Jakubowicz, 2013). Importantly the diversi-
ty of Australian society means that the huge concentra-
tions of particular immigrant groups in specific locali-
ties that characterise many European countries and 
have been linked to the “failure of multiculturalism” 
(Jakubowicz, 2013; Meer & Modood, 2011; Modood, 
2012) are not part of the Australian urban scene. Nev-
ertheless long-entrenched structures of racial exclusion 
and hierarchies continue, especially in some areas of 
major cities, driven in part by regular moral panics over 
threats to the social order that these immigrants and 
their children might represent (Dunn, Klocker, & Sala-
bay, 2007; Markus, 2014). 
These increasingly diverse diaspora communities 
are one of the local consequences of well-recognised 
global processes of “social transformation”, especially 
those accelerated by neo-liberal economic develop-
ment on the one hand, and major local conflicts in 
source countries on the other (Castles, de Hass, & Miller, 
2014). Today the newest waves of arrivals enter Aus-
tralia in very different circumstances and encounter a 
very different economic dynamic to those that greeted 
the first generation of post-White Australia immigra-
tion after the 1970s (Collins, 1991; Jakubowicz, 2009). 
The social transformation now underway in Australia 
plays a key role in generating the opportunities and 
constraints that young people from newer immigrant 
groups experience, often in ways not previously con-
sidered by public policy. Specifically the neo-liberal 
driver behind social transformation (Castles, de Haas, & 
Miller, 2014) appears to generate specific challenges 
for minority youth in relation to their familial and so-
cially-acquired cultural capital (Shah, Dwyer, & Modood, 
2010) including its value to them for gaining access to 
the wider opportunities of a multicultural society such 
as Australia. 
Four factors are important in positioning the de-
bate about immigrant youth in contemporary Australia. 
Given that our interest is in how youth from immigrant 
communities perceive and are perceived by Australian 
society, we wish to outline these factors and then ex-
plore how they interrelate.  
First the economic restructuring that has character-
ised the decades after 1983 with the floating of the 
Australian dollar, deregulation of finance and reduction 
of tariff protection, has further integrated Australia’s 
economy into that of the wider region and internation-
ally. As a consequence many industries that sought to 
recruit lower skilled migrant labour in the past, have 
now either heavily upgraded the technologies they use 
and thus the skill base of the workforce they require, 
or have failed and closed in increasingly competitive 
business environments (as has the motor vehicle man-
ufacturing industry over 2013 and 2014) (Collins, 
2013). For immigrant families, especially those with a 
fairly low skill base (including some refugee communi-
ties) (Refugee Council of Australia, 2011) the loss of 
employment by the first “father” and “mother” gener-
ation has seriously disrupted family life (Colic-Peisker & 
Tilbury, 2007). Lack of employment opportunity has 
become an increasingly vital factor in the public activi-
ties of “second (or even third) generation” youth, feed-
ing drivers that push some young people into the in-
formal or “black” economy (Abdelkerim & Grace, 2012). 
Education institutions have become front-line agencies 
in managing the impact of this changing political econ-
omy on the life chances and public attitudes of young 
people (Liddy, 2012).  
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Second, cities such as Sydney, Perth and Melbourne 
have become geographically segmented, where some 
localities can draw on industries that are more closely 
tied to the economic opportunities of an increasing 
globalised market, while others are more locally con-
strained, offering fewer possibilities for growth. More-
over in these cities three in five of people are either 
first or second-generation immigrants (born overseas 
or parent born overseas); overall some 43 per cent of 
Australia’s population is “immigrant” in that sense (Ho 
& Jakubowicz, 2013). Yet unlike many European cities 
most neighbourhoods in Australia’s cities are diverse 
rather than monocultural; it is difficult therefore to 
speak of them as “ethnic ghettoes” specific to any par-
ticular ethnic or immigrant group. It is exactly the di-
versity of locality, however, that makes attitudes to the 
local area among young second generation women and 
men such a useful barometer of their identification 
with Australian society more broadly.  
Third as globalisation has provided increasing op-
portunities for travel to homeland societies, and tech-
nology has opened up instantaneous communication 
between homelands and Australia, the time space bar-
riers that used to press so heavily on earlier genera-
tions of immigrants in relation to sustaining diasporic 
links have effectively been relegated to history. Global-
isation has therefore greatly problematized the ‘na-
tional’ in Australia, enabling diasporic identities to be 
easily accessed and sustained (Collins et al., 2012). For 
youth from minority immigrant communities (short-
handed here as “minority youth”) their sense of per-
sonal status and identity has to continually negotiate 
their changing perceptions of their parental homeland 
societies and culture, their own identification with Aus-
tralia, and their perception of how they are perceived 
in Australia by others from outside their communities. 
Identity is thus a contingent process (Colic-Peisker & 
Walker, 2003) rather than a fixed state, and its expres-
sion can vary considerably, responding to personal, 
communal, societal and global conflicts (McLeod & 
Yates, 1999). 
Fourth, the cultural capital of minority youth has 
become an increasing controversial framework for 
analysis of their experiences (Jakubowicz, 2011). The use 
of cultural (Wimmer, 2007) and social capital (Bourdieu, 
1986; Bassani, 2007) as conceptual lenses through 
which the aspirations and experiences of immigrant 
youth can be interpreted has become an important av-
enue for research. Schaefer-McDaniel (2004) in her re-
view of social capital has argued that for youth three 
dimensions are crucial: their social networks, interac-
tions and sociability; their levels of trusts and reciproci-
ty in peer and community relations; and their sense of 
belonging and attachment to place (as discussed by Hill 
& Bessant, 1999). Modood and his colleagues in the UK 
(Shah, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010) have taken the con-
cept of cultural capital, as initially proposed by Bour-
dieu (2010), and argued that cultural capital should not 
be separated from its close links to socioeconomic class 
factors and personal economic capital. Even so, they 
suggest that class per se does not provide a sufficient 
framework for analysis without the insights provided 
through a more anthropological and political inflection 
drawn from specific cultural analyses. Thus their elabo-
ration of “ethnic (cultural and social) capital” helpfully 
extends how we might explore and interpret the lived 
experiences of immigrant youth, within the framework 
of structural constraints and cultural hierarchies that 
they encounter in a multicultural society like Austral-
ia—with its continuing racialised patterns of advantage 
and disadvantage. A tension has been identified be-
tween in-group focussed “bonding” social capital, and 
other-group linking “bridging” social capital in diverse 
multicultural neighbourhoods. Diversity, it has been 
argued (e.g., Putnam, 2002) reduces inter-ethnic trust, 
tending to reinforce bonding relationships at the ex-
pense of bridging, potentially fragmenting localities in-
to pockets of bonded monocultures that interact but 
do not integrate. These worries can be key contributors 
to moral panics over the local presence of minority 
youth.  
2. Who Are Immigrant Youth? 
The most recent Australian Census (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2011) demonstrates the rapidly changing 
makeup of immigrant minority youth. For our purposes 
we are setting the parameters of this group by their re-
gions of birth, their non-European origins, and the 
presence among them of significant Muslim groups. 
These parameters derive from their fairly low position 
on an ethnic ladder of status that places European-
Australians at the top, and non-Europeans further 
down the list. The hierarchy is compounded by class 
factors, partly reflected in the occupations of their par-
ents, and partly for older youth, in their own occupa-
tions or lack of them. Intergenerational social mobility, 
a key goal of many migrants, further confuses the eth-
nicity/class interaction (Redmond, Wong, Bradbury, & 
Katz, 2014). Finally, while religious identity is not a de-
fining characteristic of minority status, and does not 
point to class position or to educational attainment, 
the stereotyping of Muslims has been one of the more 
controversial aspects of their marginalisation in public 
discourse. In addition to the overseas born, minority 
youth also encompasses many young people born in 
Australia of immigrant parents, who fit the concept of 
“visible minority”. The continuity between Australian 
born and immigrant lies most often in their shared ex-
periences of racism, discrimination and disadvantage 
(Collins et al., 2012).  
In a population of 21.5 million, there were 1.4 mil-
lion young people aged 15–19, and 1.46 million aged 
20 to 24 at the 2011 Census. Together they comprise 
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some 13 per cent of the population. Young people born 
outside Australia made up 13 per cent of 15–19 year 
olds, and 22 per cent of 20–24 year olds. Non-Europeans 
made up some 115,000 of the 15–19 year olds (about 
2/3 of the overseas born), and about 265,000 of the 
20–24 year olds (some 77 per cent of the overseas 
born). The largest overseas born groups are those from 
North and East Asia (about 24 per cent), South East 
Asia (20 per cent), Oceania (17 per cent) South and 
Central Asia (16 per cent), North West Europe (14 per 
cent), Sub Saharan Africa (7.5 per cent) and North Afri-
ca and the Middle East (6.7 per cent). Of those born 
overseas the largest group (35 per cent) comes from 
South and Central Asia (especially Pakistan and Afghan-
istan), then North Africa and the Middle East (30 per 
cent) (especially Somalia, Lebanon and Iraq), followed 
by South East Asia (11 per cent) and sub-Saharan Africa 
(8 per cent). Muslim youth make up about 3 per cent of 
the whole youth cohort in Australia, perhaps surpris-
ingly low given the level of critical attention focused on 
young Muslims, especially males. Muslim young people 
born in Australia represent the single largest country of 
origin (45%), and are increasingly of Australian-born 
parents. As indicated by the Census (ABS, 2011) how-
ever, the cultural diversity among Muslims is great, 
with over 60 different national origins identifiable.  
3. What Our Research Reveals About Immigrant 
Youth: Key Parameters  
We turn now to examine how these four parameters 
are extended when applied to two commissioned re-
search projects on immigrant youth. Our projects were 
initiated by government bodies during the period of a 
national Labor Government between 2007 and 2011, 
and were carried out for the federal bureaucracy of the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship. In each 
case the research was framed by a wider public debate, 
each with their own element of moral panic, about the 
integration of immigrant youth, their identification 
with Australian social values as expressed by key elites 
and reinforced in the media, and concerns expressed 
by the communities from which they came about ste-
reotyping, marginalisation and social exclusion (Dunn, 
Klocker, & Salabay, 2007).  
The first survey was of 340 youth—144 males and 
195 females—aged from 14 to 17 years living in Western 
and South-Western Sydney (Collins, Reid, Fabiansson, & 
Healey, 2010). Stratified sampling was employed to en-
sure that at least 80 per cent of respondents were first 
or second generation male or female youth from a 
wide range of minority backgrounds, with minority de-
fined as being of a culturally and linguistically diverse 
background (CALD). We refer to this as the 2007 CALD 
study (“CY”). The majority of youth surveyed—75 per 
cent of males and 61 per cent of females—were sec-
ond generation immigrants that is, born in Australia 
but with one or both parents born overseas. The larg-
est group of mothers was born in Tonga (25.6 per cent) 
followed by Korea (11.2 per cent), Lebanon (10.8 per 
cent) and Sudan (10.5 per cent). The largest group of 
fathers was also was born in Tonga (24.5 per cent), fol-
lowed by Korea (11.3 per cent) Sudan (10.9 per cent) 
and Lebanon (10.6 per cent). Others were born in New 
Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, China and England. Only 4.3 
per cent of the mothers and 4.4 per cent of the fathers 
were born in Australia.  
The second survey of 332 young male and female 
Muslim Australians conducted at the Muslim Eid Festi-
val and Fair in Sydney in 2010. This survey differed 
from the one above in that it also included informants 
aged 15 to 25: 165 informants were aged under 18 and 
167 aged between 18 and 25. We refer to this as the 
2010 Muslim Youth study (“MY”). Like CY, the majority 
(73 per cent of the respondents aged 15–25 years) 
were second generation immigrants born in Australia. 
First generation informants were mostly born in Iraq, 
Pakistan and Lebanon, although respondents were also 
drawn from another 26 birthplaces reflecting the great 
diversity of the Australian Muslim community. The 
overwhelming majority (94 per cent) of respondents 
were Australian citizens.  
The methodology employed for both surveys drew 
on a multi-entry snowball sample, rather than a ran-
dom sample. This method allowed us to use pre-
existing networks of trusted relationships. These two 
surveys provide some insight into immigrant youth in 
contemporary Australian society in general, and into 
aspects related to their social capital and social rela-
tionships and their subjective take on matters related 
to identities and belonging in particular. The four pa-
rameters allowed an examination of how different el-
ements of the lives of our research subjects were inter-
connected.  
4. Employment Opportunities 
Conservative and Labor Governments in Australia have 
enthusiastically embraced the globalisation agendas of 
deregulation of finance, reduction of tariff levels and 
the privatisation of public sector assets and institu-
tions. This has had a profound impact on the Australian 
economy in general, and the Australian labour market 
in particular, with secondary industries like manufac-
turing continuing to decline as tariff protection has 
been reduced or eliminated, while services sector jobs 
continue to increase. At the same time Australian im-
migration policy has been fine-tuned to embrace the 
globalisation agenda (Collins, 2013; Jakubowicz, 2013). 
There are a number of interrelated developments. Im-
migration intakes have reached record levels, despite 
the Global Finance Crisis (Collins, 2008). While the UK 
and New Zealand remain the major source countries 
for Australian immigration, intakes from Asia, Africa 
 Social Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 5-16 9 
and the Middle East have increased considerably in the 
past decade while skilled and highly qualified perma-
nent and temporary immigrants are prioritized over 
permanent family and humanitarian entrants, though 
most skilled immigrants bring family dependents with 
them. A significant proportion of those arriving in Aus-
tralia under the Refugee and Humanitarian Program are 
young people, with 59 per cent of new entrants arriving 
in the five years between July 2005 and June 2010 aged 
under 25 years on arrival, and 31 per cent aged between 
12 and 25 (Refugee Council of Australia, 2011). 
Employment is a key factor in successful immigrant 
settlement and on the socioeconomic outcomes for 
first and second generation immigrants, including those 
whose parents arrived in Australia some decades ago. 
Employment opportunities for minority immigrants, in-
cluding young people, have been shaped by the re-
structuring of the Australian economy that has accom-
panied globalisation. Changing patterns of labour 
market segmentation in Australia show that CALD im-
migrants with tertiary education and skills in the ser-
vices sector tend to get good jobs and incomes while 
other CALD immigrants with lower levels of education-
al achievement—including many Muslim immigrants—
are concentrated in jobs in the declining manufacturing 
sector or lower level jobs in the services sector (Foroutan, 
2008). On average, unemployment rates for immigrants 
are only slightly higher than non-immigrants (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2006), although immigrant 
minorities experienced larger increases in unemploy-
ment in the economic downturn following the Global 
Financial Crisis (Hugo, 2011b; Collins, 2011). But aver-
ages conceal a variety of different immigrant labour 
market experiences for CALD immigrants. More dis-
aggregated analysis by ancestry (a proxy for ethnicity), 
generation, religion or by category of immigrant entry 
reveals significant variation about the mean in terms of 
unemployment rates for immigrants. For example, 
2006 Australian Census data reveals that first and sec-
ond generation immigrants of Lebanese/Middle East-
ern ancestry, or Vietnamese and North African ances-
try, had rates of unemployment two-to-three times 
higher than average. Twenty-two per cent of the Viet-
namese second generation and 15 per cent of the 
North African/Middle East second generation were un-
employed at a time when the Australian economy was 
generally regarded as fully employed with average na-
tional unemployment rates between 5–6 per cent (Col-
lins, 2011). Muslim immigrants also suffer significantly 
higher unemployment rates than others, with preju-
dice and discrimination as key factors (Lovatt et al., 
2011). Refugees are the most disadvantaged cohort of 
immigrant arrivals and face the greatest settlement dif-
ficulties in Australia: one-third of refugee-humanitarian 
entrant settlers remain unemployed after three years 
of settlement in Australia (Hugo, 2011a, p. 104). More-
over a 2014 study of locality-linked youth employment 
demonstrated that youth unemployment in regions of 
high minority residence could be as much as three 
times as high as the national average, and twice as high 
as youth unemployment in general (though lower than 
rural rates). Discussing the implications of global eco-
nomic restructuring the Report argued that “the global 
financial crisis has had a scarring impact on the job 
prospects of Australia’s young people” (Brotherhood of 
St Laurence, 2014; Kwek, 2013).  
Educational outcomes for CALD immigrant youth 
are also uneven. Youth from families of professional 
and highly skilled immigrant parents—such as skilled 
immigrants from China and India and Korea, the largest 
countries of skilled CALD immigrant arrivals—have 
strong educational achievement in Australian schools. 
On the other hand, first generation youth from families 
where the parents have lower educational qualifica-
tions and second generation youth whose parents ar-
rived in earlier decades when there was less priority 
given to skilled immigration intakes have relatively 
poor educational outcomes in Australian schools (Red-
mond et al., 2014). This uneven educational perfor-
mance of CALD youth in Australia reinforces the pat-
terns of labour market segmentation and the uneven 
labour market outcomes of CALD youth. Young people 
from refugee families have relatively poor employment 
and educational outcomes compared to other CALD 
youth and to Australian youth as a whole (Abdelkerim 
& Grace, 2012). 
Minority youth bear many of the costs of Australia’s 
globalisation and neo-liberal economic agendas. As 
such employment opportunities decline, higher levels 
of more technically advanced skills are required, and 
school and other public education systems suffer under 
government funding cuts, and there is a “flight” of mid-
dle class children to private (fee-paying) schools associ-
ated with religious or cultural communities (Redmond 
et al., 2014).  
5. Urban Segregation 
Most Australian immigrants settle in the large Australi-
an cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and 
Adelaide (Hugo, 2011b; Hugo, Feist, & Tan, 2013). But 
immigrant settlement is not evenly distributed within 
these cities, particularly for CALD immigrant minorities. 
This is particularly evident in Sydney and Melbourne, 
Australia’s largest cities where over half of all Austral-
ia’s immigrants settle. CALD immigrants are concen-
trated in the western and south-western suburbs of 
Sydney and the western suburbs of Melbourne; how-
ever specific ethnicities never approach a majority of 
the immigrant population (Islam is not classed as an 
ethnicity, but rather as a faith community).  
Not surprisingly then Muslim immigrants also con-
centrate in these areas. According to the 2006 Census 
nearly half (47.3 per cent) of Muslims in Australian 
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lived in Sydney, while just under a third (30.3 per cent) 
lived in Melbourne (DIAC, 2007, p. 6). By 2006 seven 
out of the top ten Australian suburbs of Muslim immi-
grant settlement were in Western and South-Western 
Sydney: Auburn, in Sydney’s western suburbs, was the 
most Muslim Australian suburb, with 24.8 per cent of 
the population reporting that Islam was their religion, 
followed by Bankstown (15.2 per cent) and Canterbury 
(13.7 per cent) (DIAC, 2007, p. 7). Patterns of immi-
grant settlement are changing as newly-arrived profes-
sional and tertiary educated immigrants move to 
wealthier suburbs, such as Chatswood in Sydney’s 
North Shore for Chinese immigrants and inner north-
west suburbs of Strathfield and Eastwood for the Syd-
ney Korean population. At the 2013 election the ten 
federal electorates with the highest proportion of Mus-
lims were in western Sydney or Melbourne, and the 
top five Vietnamese seats were in the same areas; they 
were all held by the Labor Party until the election. The 
Chinese population was more dispersed across geogra-
phy and evinced a wider partisan representation 
(Mumble Census Gallery, 2013).  
Urban unemployment rates in Australia reflect the 
cultural geography of Australian cities. These western 
suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne are the areas where 
the manufacturing industry in located, and so exhibit 
high unemployment rates. For example, in 2013 while 
Sydney’s Northern Beaches and Eastern Suburbs had 
unemployment rates of 2.1 per cent and 3.2 per cent 
respectively, Fairfield-Liverpool—perhaps the densest 
area of minority immigrant settlement in Australia—
experienced an unemployment rate of 7.1 per cent. 
Similarly, Melbourne’s Outer Western area had unem-
ployment rates of 7.1 per cent while in North Western 
Melbourne the unemployment rate was 9.4 per cent. 
Broadmeadows, a Melbourne western suburb with a 
very high CALD and Muslim population, is set to experi-
ence much higher unemployment rates as the Australi-
an car industry closes down. Unemployment rates are 
higher for youth than adults. When viewed through the 
lens of cultural geography, it is clear that minority youth 
who live in areas such as western Sydney have very high 
unemployment rates. In May 2012, for example, when 
the overall unemployment rate for Western Sydney was 
5.5 per cent, for youth it was 17.9 per cent, with youth in 
Fairfield Liverpool experiencing much higher unemploy-
ment (Montoya, 2012). Muslim unemployment rates are 
more than double the average (Masanauskas, 2012). 
Immigrant settlement patterns suggest that while 
new immigrants concentrate in areas such as the west-
ern suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne, immigrant ghet-
toes do not emerge. As Hugo (2011a, p. 24) put it: “A 
distinctive characteristic of Australia’s largest cities 
compared with some other world cities, however, is 
that while there are suburbs with high proportions of 
foreign-born residents, these concentrations are not 
dominated by a single birthplace group”. This fact has 
important implications for issues related to the social 
cohesion of minority youth in Australia and to their 
sense of belonging. The riots involving immigrant minor-
ity youth in the UK (Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham in 
2002) and France (Paris in 2005) occurred in places with 
much greater concentration of immigrant youth from a 
particular ethnic or religious background (Collins & Reid, 
2009). The Cantel Report (Cantel, 2004) into the Brad-
ford, Burnley, and Oldham riots identified the “depth of 
polarisation” between white and minority youth in Brit-
ain, leading them to live disconnected “parallel lives”. 
Our reports on research with immigrant youth living in 
the suburbs of Western and South Western Sydney 
demonstrate that the population is very diverse in 
terms of ethnic, cultural, religious and social class, cos-
mopolitan or multicultural rather than monocultural 
immigrant ghettoes. 
6. Global Versus Local 
As globalisation increases the immigrant youth popula-
tions of all western nations, there has been a growing 
anxiety about the extent that these immigrant youth 
will identify with the nation and contribute to nation-
building and social cohesion in coming decades. These 
concerns about the national identity of immigrants and 
the extent to which they will buy into and identify with 
their new nation is not recent phenomena and can be 
traced to the first years of the post-war Australian im-
migration program (Kabir, 2008). Yet the recent anxiety 
about minority immigrant youth—particularly those of 
Muslim faith—are sharpened in the post-9/11 envi-
ronment, by the Cronulla beach riot, the Sydney gang 
rape involving Muslim Lebanese youth, the Bali bomb-
ings, the arrest of Muslim men in Sydney and Mel-
bourne for terrorist activities and, more recently, the 
involvement of Australian youth of Muslim background 
fighting in the conflict in Syria (Jakubowicz, 2009). 
These anxieties are generally framed around a homog-
enized and stereotyped racialised construction of mi-
nority immigrant cultures and the Muslim religion as 
being anti-Western, criminal and hostile to and sepa-
rate from—rather than integrated into and contrib-
uting to building—the Australian nation (Kabir, 2008). 
Given the limitations of social mobility pathways (e.g. 
well-paying jobs with promotional prospects) for some 
immigrant minority youth, their integration rather than 
their marginalisation and exclusion into Australian so-
ciety in part depends on how their identities are vali-
dated as stakeholders in the society.  
As Tabar, Noble and Poynting (2003) point out in 
their research on Australians of a Lebanese back-
ground, “identities are not simply symbolic entities 
through which we represent ourselves and others, but 
embodies practices of identification and adaptation 
deploying particular kinds of resources which we posi-
tion ourselves in diverse social domains”. The inform-
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ants in the 2007 CY study were asked to describe their 
national identity. Two thirds of the young people sur-
veyed were born in Australia yet only slightly more 
than one in three of the respondents identified as 
“Australian”. The rest gave a wide range of identities 
mostly related to the country of origin of their parents. 
This supports the argument that minority youth in Syd-
ney have diverse, fluid and multiple identities. Butcher 
and Thomas (2003) who also interviewed young people 
in western Sydney, found that they forged hybrid iden-
tities that incorporate their migrant identities with el-
ements of “being Australian”.  
A slightly different but related question about 
whether the informants in the 2007 CY survey felt Aus-
tralian all the time, often, sometimes or rarely, found 
that about half of the respondents “felt Australian” 
(48.5 per cent) all the time or often. Two in three 
young people reported to “often feeling good about 
living in Australia” and another one in four young peo-
ple reported to “sometimes feeling good about living in 
Australia” while a fifth of the young people did not re-
ally feel “Australian” at all. Despite this finding most 
(two in three respondents) liked living in their Sydney 
suburb and felt that they belonged in and had owner-
ship of their local neighbourhoods. On the other hand, 
one in three males and one in four females “rarely” or 
“never” felt ownership of their local area.  
The youth surveyed demonstrated strong aspira-
tions and a confidence about their future in Australia. 
Only a few of the youths expressed pessimism about 
their chances of achieving their preferred occupation in 
the future. When asked to nominate their most im-
portant values, friendship, honesty, trust, family, re-
spect and loyalty were the most frequently mentioned. 
The Muslim youth survey (2010 MY) inquired into 
many of the issues explored in the earlier survey, in-
cluding subjective assessments of identity and belong-
ing. Most of the young Muslim Australians—82 per 
cent of young Muslim women and 78 per cent of young 
Muslim men feeling—felt good about living in Austral-
ia. One in three (37 per cent) of Muslim youth surveyed 
self-identified as “Australian” while a similar number 
(37 per cent) gave their identity as “Australian Muslim”. 
Another one in five (19 per cent) responded that they 
were of hybrid identity, a combination of Australian 
with some other ethnicity or nationality. In other 
words, the vast majority of Muslim youth (93 per cent) 
surveyed used the identifier “Australian” in part or 
whole of their identity. When compared to the 2007 CY 
survey reported above, the youth in the 2010 MY sur-
vey was more likely to identify as Australian. One ex-
planation for this may be that the experience of the 
Sydney Cronulla beach riots of December 2005 reso-
nated more in the 2007 survey than the 2010 survey. 
Another relevant factor to consider is that the Muslim 
youth survey also included those aged between 18–25 
years. Even so, Muslim youth continue then to identify 
as Australian, belying the fear expressed by some that 
non-Christian immigrant youth represent a threat to 
Australian social cohesion (Kabir, 2008).  
7. Cultural and Social Capital  
A key aspect of minority immigrant youth integration 
relates to the extent to which they are socially included 
in their neighbourhood and, by extension, their nation. 
In the UK the Cantel Report suggested that immigrant 
youth were disconnected from other British youth: 
they lived parallel rather than interrelated lives. At a 
neighbourhood level the social relations between mi-
nority immigrant youth and others and their level of 
social interconnectedness and trust with other youth 
and adults is thus an important area of investigation. 
The two Sydney surveys canvassed responses to a wide 
range of questions designed to gain information about 
the lives of these immigrant youth, their friendship 
networks, values, aspirations, identities and belonging. 
In the 2007 CALD youth survey most young people sur-
veyed reported that they had multicultural social net-
works and lived lives connected to youth of other eth-
nic, cultural or religious background. The survey 
provides strong evidence that social cohesion repre-
sents the norm for inter-ethnic youth relations in Syd-
ney’s western and south-western suburbs. The young 
people who identified as “Anglo”—the largest group in 
the sample—stated that in descending order their 
friends came from Australia (the majority) , followed by 
Tonga, Lebanon, parts of Asia , as well as China and Ko-
rea. The second largest group was from New Zealand. 
The majority of their friends were Tongan, Asian and Is-
lander. The Sudanese had the majority of their friends 
among Australians and among other Sudanese, but al-
so among the Lebanese and Indian youth. 
The 2010 MY survey also explored the friendship 
networks of Muslim youth in Sydney. The vast majority 
(80 per cent) of respondents reported that they had 
non-Muslim friends. Only 16 per cent of the youth sur-
veyed had only Muslim friends, with Muslim youth 
aged under 18 twice as likely to report that all of their 
friends are Muslim as Muslim youth aged over 18. On 
the other hand, two in three (64 per cent) surveyed re-
ported that most of their friends were Muslim, while 
16 per cent reported that some of their friends were 
Muslim. Finally, questions about the values and beliefs 
that the Muslim youth held to be important were 
asked. Two in three replied that honesty and religious 
practices were most important. More than half of the 
respondents also listed responsibility, tolerance and 
respect for other people, politeness and neatness and 
patience as key values of the Muslim home. Other im-
portant values were hard work, independence, obedi-
ence, leadership and imagination. Clearly these are 
values that are consistent with “Australian values”, and 
they challenge arguments that present Islam as a 
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threat to the Australian way of life. 
Discrimination is an issue of key concern to Austral-
ia’s Muslim communities’ post 9/11. We thus asked the 
Muslim youth surveyed about their experiences of dis-
crimination at school and in the public domain. Just 
over one half of respondents (55 per cent) had never 
experienced discrimination at school, while 11 per cent 
reported one incidence of discrimination. 30 per cent 
reported that they had experienced discrimination a 
few times and 4 per cent reported that they had expe-
rienced discrimination often. While two in three Mus-
lim youth who attend Muslim schools had never expe-
rienced discrimination at school, one in two who 
attended non-Muslim schools had never experienced 
discrimination at school. Experiences of discrimination 
at school increased with the age of the respondent. 
This issue was not explored in the 2007 survey. 
Muslim youth experiences of discrimination in the 
public domain were also explored. Only a minority of 
respondents (28 per cent) reported that they had nev-
er experienced discrimination in public. Most of those 
Muslim youth surveyed reported experiencing discrim-
ination once (19 per cent) or a few times (45 per cent). 
When the gender dimension is explored, slightly more 
young Muslim women reported experiencing discrimi-
nation in public, than young Muslim men, though gen-
der differences do not appear to be significantly differ-
ent in this regards. Responses to women who wear the 
hijab are a key factor here. 
8. Marginalisation, Inclusion, Transformation and 
Public Policy 
While immigrant youth make up about one in five of the 
youth population, in parts of Australian cities where 
their communities are concentrated, seven in ten of 
overseas born youth are not of European origin. Two in 
five of North African and Middle East youth, and a quar-
ter of South and Central Asian youth are Muslim (ABS, 
2011). Thus in a comparatively short period, working 
class urban minority youth, once thought of as being 
predominantly from southern European origins, are now 
far more likely to have African, Middle Eastern or South 
Asian cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, urban 
minority youth also increasingly come from middle class 
and professional immigrant families of Chinese, Korean 
or Indian cultural backgrounds (Collins, 2013). What 
then are the implications of our research about their 
identities and experiences for both scholarly questions 
about approaches to analysing “minority”/“majority” re-
lations, and policy questions about appropriate strate-
gies for government and civil society programs? 
We have argued that the public moral panic over 
identification and participation of minority youth ob-
scures four more deeply rooted factors, namely:  
 rapidly changing economic circumstances and 
the impact of these changes on labour market 
demand and skill availability; 
 geographical segregation and the differentiation 
in opportunity that such segregation intensifies; 
 enlivening of diasporic linkages to countries of 
origin through the ease of communication and 
travel together undermining the “tyranny of dis-
tance”; and  
 widely divergent assessments of the value of 
the cultural and social capital minority youth in-
herit, reproduce and create. 
In a multicultural society there can be no single “culture”; 
but rather a complex intertwining of cultural fragments 
“sewn together” from time- and place-inflected life 
ecologies. These fragments, of different weights, draw 
in dominant culture expectations and resources, ethno-
cultural familial experiences, intergenerational peer 
group cultures, and global youth cultural ideas and de-
sires. On reflection, these fragments are integrated in-
to personal narratives that call up a hybrid identity, in 
which young people talk about the situational and con-
textual bases for expressing one aspect of their identity 
over others.  
Given the changing economic context, overlaid with 
cultural power hierarchies and public discourses that 
regularly problematize the presence of minority youth, 
one of the most important parameters of social trans-
formation will be the possibilities associated with sta-
ble, satisfying and reasonably-remunerated employ-
ment. We can see in the current recalibration of labour 
markets, that younger people with limited or inflexible 
labour market skills will experience greater difficulty in 
securing work. Compounded by discrimination in the 
labour market and stigmatisation in the discourses of 
the wider media, finding worthwhile job opportunities 
presents its own set of very real challenges.  
The cultural geography of Australian cities has not 
created the mono- or bi-cultural urban enclaves that 
produced the “parallel lives” of minority youth in Brit-
ain. The multicultural neighbourhoods of Australian cit-
ies allow for more cosmopolitan international and 
friendship networks to develop. Nevertheless evidence 
persists of the reinforcing processes of marginalisation, 
in which racism plays a rather too important role. Our 
research shows that minority youth do identify with 
their neighbourhoods and localities, feeling that they 
have a stake in the local turf, yet a minority are less 
comfortable even in the spaces in which they live com-
pared with young people of Australian majority heritage.  
Possibly the most challenging aspect of the social 
transformations in which minority youth are entwined 
relate to their sense of personal value and worth. Giv-
en that identity builds through praxis, that is to say the 
performance and production of self in a complex and 
resistant world, every component plays a contributing 
role. Minority youth draw on cultural capital that they 
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possess (from the sources discussed above) and in the 
process utilise and contribute to the building of social 
capital. It is apparent from the findings that there is ev-
idence for “bridging social capital”, and that “bonding 
social capital” is quite well developed in comparison to 
relations they have into wider institutions and across 
into other social groups. This is not unusual for minori-
ty immigrant communities experiencing significant lev-
els of discrimination, racism and various forms of ineq-
uity. Their capacity to enter into wider social and 
economic relations will therefore depend heavily on the 
success they have in gaining educational and training 
qualifications. The minority of minority youth who do 
not succeed in the educational system (and the majority 
clearly are able to gain social mobility in the generation 
after their parents’ arrival) are confronted by labour 
markets far less interested in unskilled school leavers.  
The public policy implications of this research also 
require us to link together the four critical compo-
nents. Social inclusion will depend on awareness and 
careful appreciation of local economic environments 
and the sorts of skills that are increasingly required. 
Urban regional employment and educational intelli-
gence strategies across three levels of government, in-
corporating civil society and business organisations 
should plan to integrate technology and employment 
forecasting, with flexible forms of educational delivery 
at school, in technical and further education (TAFE), 
and in more specialised professional areas. Unfortu-
nately national policy priorities have moved away from 
concerns that would directly address the employ-
ment/social inclusion nexus (the Coalition government 
has abandoned the former government’s social inclu-
sion strategy and the Board that managed it, while 
state governments are reducing funding to the TAFE 
sectors in New South Wales and Victoria). Moreover 
the national government has argued that the market 
should determine the survival of businesses, and those 
that are not viable in a free market should be permit-
ted to disintegrate. The most significant concentrations 
of most vulnerable minority youth live in regions where 
“old industry” is most prevalent, and they are there-
fore most likely to experience the closure of industries 
that in the past offered significant employment to their 
parents and elder siblings. Industry redeployment 
strategies should therefore include those “not yet” in 
the workforce as an element in any equation.  
Even though Australia is a multicultural society, 
many public narratives of contemporary life tend to 
portray minority youth as antagonistic to the core val-
ues of society. Yet our findings demonstrate that on 
many counts minority youth hold very strongly to what 
might be seen as core Australian values, especially val-
ues associated with more conservative faith communi-
ties. Moreover, they have strong aspirations and see a 
very strong and positive future for themselves in Aus-
tralia in the coming decades.  
While the public policy implications require more 
attention than can be given here, two cultural policy 
trajectories need to be reinforced. First sustained work 
is needed with the media by government and civil soci-
ety to reduce the negative and stereotypical represen-
tation of minorities as threats or victims. The media 
will need to take greater responsibility for opening op-
portunities for the representation of and participation 
of minority youth as the subjects in their own and wid-
er Australian narratives, from advertising to drama, 
from news and current affairs, to comedy and melo-
drama. Where this proves effective it can increase the 
confidence and therefore the participation of minority 
youth, while also reducing the apprehension expressed 
by older Australian communities about newer and un-
familiar arrivals. There is also a clear need to strength-
en anti-racist discrimination institutions, policies and 
practices in Australia, though the current trend is strong-
ly in the opposite direction. 
Finally a wider societal conversation needs to 
emerge that can discuss what it means to have a multi-
cultural society that reduces the salience of ethnicity as 
a barrier to mobility and participation, while support-
ing the development of cultural expressions that bridge 
between Australia’s many cultural communities, how-
ever “novel” they may appear to “old Australia”. The 
social transformations sweeping through Australia as a 
consequence of global, national and regional changes 
will carry serious consequences for cohesion and inclu-
sion. Recognition of the dangers and the identification 
of the opportunities may ensure that their impact leads 
to greater future economic prosperity, mobility and so-
cio-cultural integration. 
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